REDUCTION AND AVOIDANCE OF ORGANISATIONAL INCENTIVES
Installation of SAP milieus
This makes the technical user the dialogue user and a login in the SAP system is unrestricted. So Johannes logs in with the known password of the RFC user in the production system. Thanks to very extensive permissions, it now has access to all sorts of critical tables, transactions, and programmes in production. With the identity of the RFC user Johannes starts with the technical compromise of the production system... RFC Security: All invented - or everyday threat? Whether a simple trim, altered biometric properties or an encapsulated technical user in the SAP system: the basis of the compromise is the same. A person uses a different identity to gain access and permissions to protected areas. Moreover, the evil in all three stories could have been prevented by pro-activity. When was the last time you thought about the security of your RFC interfaces? Can you say with certainty that all your technical RFC users only have the permissions they actually need? And do you know who exactly knows the passwords of these users? Can you 100% rule out that not now in this moment an SAP user with a false identity infiltrates your production systems? Change now: It's about pro activity! But before you start now and start looking for the "identity converter" (which I really do not recommend!), I suggest that you take root of evil and proactively strengthen your RFC security. So if you want to find out more, I have the following 3 tips for you: 1) Our e-book about SAP RFC interfaces 2) Clean up our free webinar about RFC interfaces 3) Blog post about our approach to optimising RFC interfaces As always, I look forward to your feedback and comments directly below these lines!
A trick often used by administrators is to allow for time buffers before starting the next job. The buffer times are necessary because it is not possible to predict exactly how long a job will take to complete, since the duration depends on many incalculable parameters. Since it makes little sense to run backups and SAP jobs at the same time, these tasks are usually done one after the other rather than in parallel. In more complex environments, data backup durations, time buffers and job runtimes add up to such an extent that the time available is no longer sufficient to perform all activities within the available time corridor. Tools that work with status dependencies and then automatically start the next job when its predecessor job has been processed without errors can help here.
INSERT SAP basis KNOWLEDGE
The operator is now responsible for ensuring smooth and safe operation in the SAP environment. It has a basic understanding of the infrastructure and is well connected within the IT departments. For his daily work he uses suitable tools (e.g. monitoring tools), in which he is trained and trained. In the future, the focus will be on reactive activities such as monitoring systems and processing notifications. The operator acts as a customer of SME-expression standardisation and automation as well as the SME-expression-solution manager. Also, the operational aspects of this role are suitable for outsourcing. However, the accountable parts remain in the company.
Understanding the structure and functioning of the system is especially important for IT administration. It is not for nothing that "SAP Basis Administrator" is a separate professional field. On the page www.sap-corner.de you will find useful information on this topic.
To store all the information on the subject of SAP - and others - in a knowledge database, Scribble Papers is suitable.
New risks in SAP HANA: In addition to the known risks, there are also new risks from the use of SAP HANA. A very good example are frequently used web applications that represent something new in the SAP area. In contrast to an SAP ERP system, HANA systems consist mainly of web applications, which were considered optional in the previous versions. These web applications can be found by various search engines on the Internet. This also applies to SAP Portal or Netweaver. There are URL schemes that help locate the system. This also applies to other SAP systems that use Web applications. This makes the new technology vulnerable to typical web attacks. SQL Injection, ABAP Code Injection, or XSS are all included. All risks known for a normal SAP system also apply to a SAP-HANA system. The data is stored unencrypted in RAM. Only then does the system gain this speed advantage. This results in risks such as a read-out by memory scraping malware. These pick up data in memory. Encryption costs performance, so it is not used by default. Especially during a migration HANA runs in a parallel system, therefore at least one new system comes to your landscape. Also note: HANA has its own tools and settings that need to be known and configured. The bottom line is that the system simply needs more attention when operating. Many settings often result in more errors. Three - points - HANA Security Plan 1) Roles and permissions In a previous SAP system, roles and permissions are certainly one of the main pillars of a secure system. Roles and permissions work differently in a HANA system. There are two types of users: 1) Default (limited): With this type of user, there are different access methods to the database. For example, the JDBC or HTTP technologies are used to give two examples.
With "Shortcut for SAP Systems" a tool is available that greatly facilitates some tasks in the SAP basis.
As of SAP Basis Plug-In 2005.1, the release levels of the two plug-ins no longer need to correspond.
Constant further development and growing complexity are placing ever-increasing demands on the SAP infrastructure in terms of performance and feasibility.